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taxes (convex tax function) while the rich and the poor can reduce their
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(concave tax function). We then investigate three solutions to this cycling
problem: (i) reducing the policy space to the policies that are ideal for some
voter; (ii) weakening the voting equilibrium concept; (iii) assuming parties
also care about the size of their majority. The main result is that progres-
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the extremes of the income distribution. Interestingly the poor would prefer
regressive taxes.
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Why do most democratic countries tend to propose marginal progressive
income tax schedules? The economic literature has tried to answer this
question by resorting either to a normative or a positive approach. The
normative approach assumes that tax policies are chosen by a benevolent
planner, whose objective is to maximize social welfare under informational
and incentive constraints. Unfortunately, this approach has proven very
inconclusive on the shape of the optimal tax function (for a recent account,
see Myles, 2000). A notable exception is when the planner￿s objective is
to choose a ￿fair￿ tax schedule. Indeed, Young (1990) has shown that the
equal sacri￿ce requirement implies progressive taxation.
The positive approach, to whom this paper clearly belongs, stresses the
fact that tax schedules are, directly or indirectly, chosen democratically. It
is also often assumed that voters are self-interested. The main diﬃculty in
applying voting theory to (non-linear) income taxation resides in the multi-
dimensionality of the policy space. It is well known that the aggregation,
by means of majority voting, of transitive individual preferences on a multi-
dimensional set of options may result in a non-transitive social preference.
In other words, majority may give rise to voting cycles, where policy a is
majority preferred to policy b which in turn is majority preferred to policy
c, which eventually is majority preferred to policy a. No natural majority
winner emerges in such situations.
The apparent stability of the democratic demand for progressivity con-
trasts sharply with this vote cycling. Economists have proposed diﬀerent
explanations to this puzzle. The most common one is to consider that the
true policy space is not so large and that it should be possible to apply
s o m ek i n do fm e d i a nv o t e rt h e o r e mo nt h i sr e s t r i c t e dp o l i c ys p a c e . T h e
key question is of course what is the natural reduction of the policy space.
Romer (1975) reduces the policy space to linear tax schedules and obtains a
1Condorcet winner involving average progressivity (see also Roberts (1977)).
Berliant and Gouveia (1994) introduce uncertainty over the income distri-
bution and then use the ex-ante budget balance requirement to reduce the
policy space so that a Condorcet winner exists. Snyder and Kramer(1988)
assume that candidates cannot credibly commit to implement something dif-
ferent from their most-preferred policy and thus if everybody can stand as
a candidate (like in Citizen Candidates models of Osborne-Slivinsky (1996)
and Besley-Coate (1997)) then the true policy space reduces to the policies
that are ideal for some voter. In doing so they obtain a Condorcet winner
involving progressive taxes. Roemer (1999) considers that the policy space
is reduced not by lack of commitment but rather by the need to reach a
intra-party consensus among ￿opportunists￿ whose only objective is to win
the elections, and ￿militants￿ who care only about the policy chosen by their
party. He shows that there exists a Condorcet winner in this reduced policy
space and that it involves progressive taxes.
Recently, Marhuenda and Ortuno-Ortin (1995) have followed another
approach. Instead of isolating a majority winning tax schedules, they seek
to provide some insights on the democratic demand for progressivity. Indeed
they obtain the remarkable result that any marginal progressive tax wins
over any regressive one provided that the median is less than the mean
income. This popular support for progressivity result is obtained with self-
interested voters who vote for the tax policy that taxes them less.1
The problem with Marhuenda and Ortuno-Ortin (1995)￿s analysis is that
it gives only a partial account of the majority voting process. Indeed Hin-
driks (2000) has provided a reverse popular support for regressivity result
according to which any marginal progressive tax can in turn be defeated by
a marginal regressive tax (supported by a majority coalition of the extremes
of the income distribution). This result holds true for any distribution of
1The result has been generalized by Mitra et al (1998) to more sophisticated voters
who also care about their relative position in the income distribution.
2income provided that the median is below the mean income. Of course com-
bining this regressivity result with the progressivity result establishes the
inevitable voting cycle. We shall discuss that in Section 3.
The model we develop in this paper involves quadratic tax functions with
variable labour supply.2 Using a similar model, Cukierman and Meltzer
(1991) have shown that the existence of a Condorcet winner can only be
obtained under rather strong and mainly unjusti￿able conditions. So we
investigate three ways of circumventing this non-existence problem. First,
we consider a natural reduction of the policy space to tax schedules that are
ideal for some voter and we show that a Condorcet winner exists on this
policy subset. This is the approach adopted in Section 4. Second we keep
the entire policy space but adopt less demanding political equilibrium con-
cepts that are Condorcet-consistent (i.e., they uniquely select the Condorcet
winner if any) such as the uncovered set and the bipartisan set.3 This is
t h ea p p r o a c hw ef o l l o wi nS e c t i o n5 . T h i r dw ec o n s i d e rad y n a m i cv o t i n g
game due to Kramer (1977) in which two political parties alternate in power
(due to the non-existence of a Condorcet winner) and propose policies that
maximise their vote shares (i.e., they care about the size of their majority).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the
model. Section 3 demonstrates that vote cyclung is inevitable. Section
4 studies the reduction of the policy space to voters￿ blisspoints. Section 5
studies weaker political equilibrium concepts. Section 6 explores the Kramer
dynamic voting game. Section 7 concludes.
2This class of non-linear tax schedules accomodates in a simple way both (marginal)
regressive and progressive taxes. It has been adopted in Cukierman and Meltzer (1991)
as well as in Roemer (1999).
3See De Donder et al.(2000) for a presentation and a set-theoretical comparison of
these diﬀerent solution concepts.
32T h e M o d e l
We consider a two-good economy (consumption and labor) populated by a
large number of individuals who diﬀer only in their ability. Each individual
is characterized by her ability to earn income, w ∈ [0,1]. The distribution
of ability in the population is described by a strictly increasing distribution
function F on [0,1], so that F(w) is the fraction of the population with










We assume throughout that wm ≤ w. Individuals choose the amount
of labor they sell on a competitive market and receive a wage rate equal
to their ability. The production sector exhibits constant-returns-to-scale so
that the wage rate is constant. Then an individual with ability w 6=0w h o
supplies y/w u n i t so fl a b o re a r n sp r e - t a xi n c o m ey. Her after-tax income is
x(y,t)=y − t(y)( 3 )
where t(y) is a continuous tax function t : R+ → R. Note that we allow for
negative taxes.
A feasible tax function satis￿es the following conditions.
t(y) ≤ y for all y ∈ R+ (4)
t0(y) ≤ 1 for all y ∈ R+ (5)
Z 1
0
t(y(w))dF(w)=0 ( 6 )
Condition (4) says that tax liabilities cannot exceed taxable income. Con-
dition (5) implies that after-tax income is non-decreasing in pre-tax income.
4The budget balance condition (6) means that income taxation is purely
redistributive (i.e., zero revenue requirement).
Note that these conditions place few restrictions on the set of admissible
tax schedules which is in￿nitely dimensional. Given that we are mainly
interested to explain the prevalence of progressive income taxation, we shall
thereafter restrict attention to tax schedules that are either concave, linear
or convex everywhere. This class of tax schedules is nicely represented by
the quadratic tax function.4
t(y)=−c + by + ay2 (7)
where c ≥ 0 is the uniform lump-sum transfer, b is the linear tax parameter
(with 0 ≤ b ≤ 1) and a is the progressivity tax parameter, with a>0
indicating a progressive tax scheme (i.e. marginal tax rates increasing with
pre-tax income) and a<0 representing a regressive one. As will become
clear shortly, the feasibility conditions (4) and (5) impose lower and upper
bounds on the progressivity parameter (−1
2 ≤ a ≤ +1
2) . Intuitively, too
much progressivity would make the marginal tax rate greater than one at the
top of the income distribution while too much regressivity would bankrupt
the poor individuals (t(y) >yfor low y). Combining (6) and (7) yields
c = by + ay2 (8)
where y =
R
y(w)dF(w)a n dy2 =
R
y2(w)dF(w). Hence, tax policies are
two-dimensional, (a,b) ∈ [−1
2, 1
2] ￿ [0,1]. Plugging (7) and (8) into (3) we
get
x = y +( 1− b)(y − y) − a(y2 − y2)( 9 )
Given the tax parameters (a,b), individual with ability w chooses pretax
income y(a,b;w) that maximises u(x, y
w) subject to (9). Throughout we
assume quasi-linear preferences over consumption and labour supply.
4The quadratic tax function has already been used in a voting context by Cukierman












With this formulation of preferences there is no income eﬀect on labour
supply decision and everyone chooses to work.5 While this is a highly re-
strictive speci￿cation of preferences, it captures the incentive eﬀects of taxes
(consumption-leisure trade-oﬀ), thus making it more general than the mod-
els with ￿xed income (like Roemer, 1999), and it is also considerably more
tractable than the general speci￿cation of Cukierman-Meltzer (1991), allow-
ing us to obtain clear, intuitive results.
For this speci￿cation of preferences and given the tax parameters (a,b)




Therefore marginal tax progressivity (a>0) reduces the pre-tax income
of everyone. But because progressivity decreases more the pre-tax income of
the rich, the dispersion of pre-tax income decreases. The ￿gure below illus-
trates the eﬀect of progressivity and regressivity on pre-tax income levels.













Figure 1. Eﬀect of progressive and regressive taxes on pre-tax income.
Let ω(a)= w2
1+2aw2, then slightly abusing notation we obtain
y =( 1− b)ω(a) (12)
y =( 1− b)ω(a) (13)
















= −2(1 − b)ω2(a) < 0 (16)
∂y2
∂a




We can now derive the precise restrictions on (a,b) needed to satisfy the
feasibility conditions. Condition(5) requires that t0(y)=b +2 ay ≤ 1 for all
y ∈ R+. Clearly this condition is satis￿ed for all a ∈ [−1
2,0] since b ∈ [0,1].
It is also satis￿ed for all a ∈ (0, 1
2] because from (11), t0(y)=b +2 ay =
b +( 2aw2
1+2aw2)(1 − b) ≤ 1 for all w ∈ [0,1] and for all b ∈ [0,1]. Since the
marginal rate of taxation is less than one everywhere, condition (4) simply
reduces to t(0) ≤ 0, that is
c = by + ay2 ≥ 0
= b(1 − b)ω(a)+a(1 − b)2ω2(a) ≥ 0 (18)
where the second equation follows from (13) and (14). Hence, regressivity
(a<0) imposes the following lower bound on b,




It can be shown that this lower bound is decreasing with a and
b(a) > 0f o r a<0
=0 f o ra =0
< 0f o r a>0.
The feasible policy set is then X = {a,b : −1
2 ≤ a ≤ 1
2,0 ≤ b ≤ 1,b(a) ≤ b}.
8Remark 1: For any distribution F(w),i fb ∈ [1
3,1] then ∂c/∂a ≤ 0 for
all a ∈ [0, 1
2].






+ y2 + a
∂y2
∂a
Which using (14),(16) and (17) gives
∂c
∂a
=( 1− b)(1 − 3b)ω2(a) − 4a(1 − b)2ω3(a). (20)
Since for any b ∈ [1
3,1 ] ,w eh a v e( 1− b)(1 − 3b) ≤ 0, and for any a ≥ 0a n d
any distribution F(w), we have ω2(a),ω3(a) > 0, it follows that ∂c/∂a ≤ 0.
Remark 1 leads to the following:
Remark 2: A n yp o l i c yi n v o l v i n ga ∈ [0, 1
2] and b ∈ [1
3,1] is Pareto
dominated.
This is a straightforward implication of Remark 1 since decreasing a from
a ∈ [0, 1
2]g i v e nb ∈ [1
3,1] cannot not decrease c but will lower the tax burden
of everyone, making everyone better oﬀ.
We can also wonder whether the poor would prefer regressive taxes or
progressive taxes. Clearly the poorest individual with income y = 0 will
choose the value of a that maximizes the transfer c. Fixing b ∈ [0,1] and














Remark 3: For any distribution F(w) maximizing the utility of the
poorest individual (or maximizing the transfer c) requires progressivity when
9b<1/3,l i n e a r i t yw h e nb =1 /3 and regressivity when b>1/3.
Note that this result does not depend on the distribution of ability.
Resorting to numerical simulations for various distributions of ability we
further get that (i) the transfer maximizing value of a is monotonically
decreasing with b and that (ii) transfer is globally maximized with regressive
taxation (and thus b>1/3). So the poor would prefer regressive taxes.
We can now derive the indirect utility function. Substituting (3), (7)
and (12) into the utility function (10) one obtains,
v(a,b;w)=c +( 1− b)2 ω(a)
2
. (21)
Hence for any individual with ability w (which maps to w(a)= w2
1+2aw2)t h e









∂c/∂a − (1 − b)2ω2(a)
⁄






The marginal rate of substitution between the two tax parameters is the
result of their marginal eﬀect on the transfer net of their marginal eﬀect on
tax liability. Pareto eﬃciency requires ∂c/∂a>0a n d∂c/∂b>0. Moreover,
due to incentive eﬀects (15)-(17), we have that for any a>0, ∂c/∂a<y2
and ∂c/∂b<y. Therefore all those with either low income such that both
y<y 1 = ∂c/∂b and y2 <y 2 = ∂c/∂a or high income such that both
y>y 1 and y2 >y 2 will display a negative marginal rate of substitution.
Those in the middle of the income distribution with income y such that
(y − y1)(y2 − y2) < 0 will display a positive marginal rate of substitution.
We now turn to the voting problem over the admissible policies (a,b) ∈
X. It is well known since Plott (1967) that the conditions required to ob-
tain a Condorcet winner (i.e. a policy preferred by a majority of individuals
10to any other feasible policy) in multi-dimensional settings are extremely
demanding. In the absence of Condorcet winner, the social preference gen-
erated by majority voting exhibits cycles. In the next section, we establish
the inevitable voting cycle over regressive and progressive taxes.
3 Inevitable Voting Cycle
The inevitable character of vote cycling over quadratic tax functions is best
seen by considering ￿x e dp r e - t a xi n c o m e .I nd o i n gs ow ec a ni n d e e dp r o v e
the inevitable aspect of vote cycling by means of two propositions. The ￿rst
proposition is a simple adaptation to quadratic tax functions of a result due
to Marhuenda and Ortuno-Ortin (1995).
Proposition 1: (Marhuenda and Ortuno-Ortin, 1995) Suppose income
is ￿x e da n dd i s t r i b u t e da c c o r d i n gt oF(y) over [0,Y],w i t hm e d i a nb e l o w
mean income, ym ≤ y. Then for any tax scheme t2 = −c2+b2y+a2y2 there
exists a more progressive tax scheme t1 = −c1 + b1y + a1y2 with a1 >a 2,
b1 < (>)b2 and c1 >c 2 such that a majority of voters prefer t1 over t2.
Proof: Consider the two tax schedules t1 = −c1 + b1y + a1y2 and t2 =
−c2 + b2y + a2y2 and let
T = t1 − t2 = −(c1 − c2)+( b1 − b2)y +( a1 − a2)y2
= −c + by + ay2 (22)
with a = a1 − a2 > 0, b = b1 − b2 < (>)0, and c = c1 − c2 > 0. From
the balanced budget constraint, we have c = by +ay2. Clearly, T is strictly











11So, T(y) < 0a n ds i n c eT is strictly convex, T must be strictly increasing
and therefore T(y) < 0 for all y ∈ [0,y], that is all those with income below
t h em e a ni n c o m ep a yl e s st a x e su n d e rt1 than under t2.S i n c eym ≤ y more
than half the voters would prefer t1 to t2 and the result follows. QED
This proposition re￿ects the success of the middle class in minimizing its
own tax burden. Greater progressivity in income taxation actually reduces
the tax burden on middle-income taxpayers at the expense of high-income
taxpayers. This is of course reminiscent of Director￿s Law of Income Redis-
tribution (Stigler,1970). The voting cycle follows from the next proposition
according to which regressivity can always defeat progressivity with a ma-
j o r i t yc o a l i t i o no ft h ee x t r e m e s( r i c ha n dp o o r ) .
Proposition 2: (Hindriks, 2000) Suppose income is ￿xed and distributed
according to F(y) in [0,Y],w i t hym < y and Y large enough. Then for any
tax scheme t2 = −c2 + b2y + a2y2 there exists a less progressive tax scheme
t1 = −c1+b1y+a1y2 with a1 <a 2 , b1 >b 2 and c1 >c 2 such that a majority
of voters prefers t1 over t2.
Proof: see Hindriks (2000).
Figure 2 illustrates this proposition. t1 is preferred by a majority to t2 if
the probability mass on the interval [y1,y 2]i sl e s st h a n1 /2. Notice that the
result is true irrespective of the form of the income distribution, provided
that the median is less than the mean income.6 This result is not trivial.
Indeed the average income y is always lying within [y1,y 2] and the lower the
probability mass around y, the greater the length of [y1,y 2].












Figure 2. Regressive tax t1 preferred by a majority to progressive tax t2.
Introducing variable income (as formalized in the previous section) does
not break the voting cycle down as Figures 3 a, b and c show respectively
for the uniform, the triangular and the linear decreasing distributions of
ability.7 Notice that for each distribution, the median is less than the mean
income even though the distribution of ability is symmetric. The cycle ABC
( w i t hAp r e f e r r e dt oB ,Bp r e f e r r e dt oCa n dCp r e f e r r e dt oA )a r i s e sf r o m
alternating majority coalitions consisting of the poor and the middle class
supporting more progressivity (as in Proposition 1) and then the poor and
the rich supporting more regressivity (as in Proposition 2).
7For each ￿gure, a and b vary by increments of 0.05 respectively in [−0.5,0.5] and [0,1].
13Insert Figures 3 a, b, c
In the following sections we shall see how we can escape this vote cycling
diﬃculty and gain insight on which tax functions have a chance to emerge
as political equilibria: ￿rst by reducing naturally the voting space (Section
4), then by applying weaker political equilibrium concepts (Section 5); and
lastly by assuming that political parties also care about the size of their
majority (Section 6).
4 Natural reduction of the policy space
In this section, we restrict the policy space to the set of feasible tax schedules
that are most-preferred by some voter. This assumption seems a natural way
to reduce the policy space, and has been successfully adopted by Snyder and
Kramer (1988) enabling them to obtain a Condorcet winner with progressive
taxation.8 T h i sr e d u c t i o no ft h ep o l i c ys p a c ec a na l s ob em o t i v a t e di n
the line of the Citizen Candidates models as a lack of commitment from
candidates selected from the set of voters and who can only credibly propose
their most-preferred policy (see Osborne-Slivinsky, 1996, and Besley-Coate,
1997).
In Figures 4 a,b,c we have represented the bliss points of the electorate
for the three distributions of ability we are considering.9 Surprisingly the
distribution of bliss points has a similar form for each ability distribution.
The lowest-ability individual prefers the policy that maximizes c (i.e., the
peak of the Laﬀer surface). This is the regressive tax schedule, with the
highest b and the lowest a<0, namely the top of the upper curve in the
distribution of bliss points. The second lowest-ability individual prefers a
8However, their model diﬀers from ours in the sense that individuals do not respond
to taxation by substituting untaxable leisure to taxable labor, but rather by working in
a nu n t a x e ds e c t o rw i t hl o w e rw a g er a t e .
9For each ￿gure, a and b vary by increment of 0.005 respectively in [−0.5,0.5] and [0,1],
that is they take on 200 diﬀerent values each.
14slightly less regressive tax (lower b for a slightly higher a) ,a n ds oo nm o v i n g
downwards along the upper curve as ability increases, until we reach a voter
with an ability close to the median who prefers the progressive tax policy
with b = 0 and the highest a>0. From that point on we move to the
left along the horizontal axis as ability increases, involving less and less
progressivity as a decreases. Then we reach the median ability individual
who prefers (am,b m)=( 0 .285,0), (0.25,0) and (−0.15,0.4) for the uniform,
the triangular and the linear decreasing distributions, respectively. The
move to the left (lower a) continues as ability further increases, moving
progressively upwards along the lower curve. This lower curve is in fact the
lower bound of the feasibility condition (19) which means that all these bliss
points are in fact constrained by the feasibility condition b>b (a).
Figures 4 a,b,c
We can now put the bliss points by increasing order of ability and derive
the (indirect) utility function of each voter over this distribution of bliss
points. Interestingly enough we obtain that for the three distributions of
ability, each voter displays single-peaked preference over this ordered set of
bliss points. Therefore it follows from the median voter theorem that the
bliss point of the median voter is a Condorcet winner.10 Since the median
voter is also the more favourable to progressivity we get a ￿rst possible
explanation for the prevalence of progressive taxation.11
In the following section, instead of reducing the policy space we study
weaker solution concepts in the context of a standard Downsian political
competition game.
10Roell (1997) obtains a similar result with quasi-linear preferences. We thank Robin
Boadway for pointing out this paper to our attention.
11In the case of the linearly decreasing distribution of ability, the median ability is so
low that the median voter prefers regressivity like the low-ability voters.
155 The simultaneous two-party competition game
We consider a Downsian voting game with two political parties competing to
win the election. Both parties simultaneously announce their tax schedule
(a pair (a,b)) which they commit to impose if elected. Each individual then
votes for the party whose platform is better according to his/her preferences.
The party receiving the most votes wins the election and imposes its platform
as the choice of the polity. In the event of ties, a fair coin decides which
party wins the election. Note that in constrast with Section 4, it is assumed
here that candidates can commit to any policy.
Formally, we denote the (￿nite) set of feasible policies by X.A ne l e m e n t
of X is thus a pair (a,b). Let P denote the majority preference relation on
this set X.T h e majority preference P o v e ra n yp o l i c yp a i r( x,y) ∈ X2 is
given by,
xPy : n(x,y) >n (y,x)
yPx : n(x,y) <n (y,x),
where n(x,y)=# {w ∈ [0,1] : v(x;w) >v (y;w)} is the number of voters
who (weakly) prefer x to y,a n dn(y,x)=# {w ∈ [0,1] : v(x;w) <v (y;w)}
is the number of voters who prefer y to x.12
Assuming an odd number of voters, the majority preference relation is a
binary relation satisfying the asymmetry and completeness properties of a
tournament.
The objectives assigned to the parties are crucial. We suppose that par-
ties are only interested in winning the election and that they derive no in-
trinsic utility from the platform chosen (i.e., no ideology). Moreover parties
are indiﬀerent about the size of their majority: having a bare majority they
attach no utility to any extra vote. Given that parties can choose among
12We rule out indiﬀerence since it is a very unlikely event.
16the same set of feasible policies, we can represent this electoral competition








This game, called the majority game, has a unique Nash equilibrium in
pure strategies if and only if there exists a Condorcet winner. Formally,
x ∈ X is a Condorcet winner if and only if xPy for all y ∈ X\{x}.I nt h i s
case, both parties choose the Condorcet winner as a strategy.
But we know from Section 3 that there is no Condorcet winner in the
(unrestricted) two-dimensional policy space. It follows that the game does
not have any equilibrium in pure strategies: each party could win the election
if it knew which policy is chosen by the other party.13
However, the absence of a Condorcet winner does not imply that any policy
is equally likely to be selected by any party. First, we do not expect any
party to select a Pareto dominated policy x (like a>0a n db>1/3).
Second, we feel con￿dent that any party is unlikely to propose weakly
dominated policies. A policy x is weakly dominated by policy y if U (x,z) ≥
U (y,z) for all z ∈ X, with a strict inequality for at least one z.R e f o r m u l a t e d
in our voting context, y weakly dominating x means that y beats x as well
as any policy z that x can beat.
In the social choice literature, this dominance relation is also called the
covering relation (see Miller, 1980). Formally, given a tournament (X,P),
a policy x ∈ X is covered whenever there exists some other policy y ∈ X
such that yPx and {z : xPz} ⊆ {z : yPz}. The set of non-covered options
for the majority preference relation P is called the uncovered set, denoted
UC(X,P). Since the covering relation is equivalent to the weak dominance
13This is in contrast to Cukierman and Meltzer (1991) who make very restrictive as-
sumptions on the ability distribution and voters￿ preferences to get the existence of a
Condorcet winner over quadratic income tax schemes. In our model even with very sim-
ple preferences and ability distributions the Condorcet winner fails to exist.
17relation in our setting, the uncovered set is precisely the set of weakly un-
dominated pure strategies of the two-party zero-sum game G = {X,X,U}.
Given that any Pareto-dominated policy is covered, the uncovered set is a
subset of the Pareto set.14
We can further restrict the set of interesting strategies by looking at the
Nash equilibrium in pure strategies of this game.15 Laﬀond et al. (1993)
have shown that the ￿nite and symmetric majority game G =( X,X,U)
has a unique equilibrium in mixed strategies. They call the support of this
unique equilibrium the bipartisan set denoted BP(X,P).16 It can be shown
that the bipartisan set is a subset of the uncovered set and thus a more
discriminating solution concept (see Banks et al., 1996). Furthermore, both
the uncovered set and the bipartisan set reduce to the Condorcet winner
when the latter exists.
Given these de￿nitions, we can now compute the Pareto set, the uncov-
ered set and the bipartisan set for the three distributions of ability. The
results are reported below.17
Insert Figures 5 a,b,c
As Figures 5 a,b,c indicate the distribution of abilities matters a lot in
determining whether progressive taxation is likely to emerge in equilibrium.
With a triangular distribution (Figure 5b), regressive taxes are weakly dom-
inated (and a fortiori are never played in the mixed strategies Nash equi-
librium). The reason is that this symmetric distribution implies a large
14If x is Pareto-dominated by y, y has a better position than x in every individual
preference ordering. Hence, using majority voting, y beats all the options that x beats,
which means that y covers x.
15See Laslier(2000) for an interpretation of electoral mixed strategies
16The bipartisan set is thus the set of options played with a strictly positive probability
at the equilibrium.
17For each ￿gure, a and b vary by increment of 0.05 respectively in [−0.5,0.5] and [0,1].
18middle income group who can impose progressivity in order to reduce its
own tax burden at the expense of the high-income group. The reverse holds
when we shift the probability mass to the low ability levels as with the lin-
ear decreasing distribution (Figure 5c). In this case, the low-income group
becomes suﬃciently large to impose regressive taxes in order to maximize
tax revenue (and thus redistribution). When ability levels are uniformly
distributed (Figure 5a), then both regressive and progressive taxation can
emerge in equilibrium. Therefore, these results suggest that the prevalence
of progressive taxation can only be explained by the predominance of the
middle class in the income distribution or equivalently by a lack of polariza-
tion at the extremes of the income distribution. Figures 5a,b,c also reveal
that the Uncovered set and the Bipartisan set are very discriminating so-
lution concepts. This is in contrast to Epstein (1997) who shows that for
games of purely distributive politics the Uncovered set coincides approx-
imately with the Pareto set. Our results demonstrate that for the game
studied here, the Uncovered set (and a fortiori the Bipartisan set) can give
rather sharp predictions on equilibrium outcomes.
In the next section we analyse how it is possible to get better predictions
on the equilibrium outcomes by changing the rules which dictate the play
of the game instead of changing the equilibrium concept.
6 The sequential two-party competition game
We use the dynamic version of the two-party electoral competition game
due to Kramer (1977). In this voting game, two political parties repeatedly
compete for the votes with the peculiarity that when a party is elected, it
is committed to keep the same political platform for the next election (rep-
utation inertia). In absence of Condorcet winner, this assumption implies
that both parties alternate in oﬃce because each party can win the election
once it knows the policy chosen by the other party. It is further assumed
19that parties are interested in maximizing the size of their majority (or net
plurality de￿ned as n(x,y)−n(y,x)), and thus the opposition party will al-
ways select a policy which maximizes its voting share given the incumbent￿s
policy. This dynamic voting process can be represented by the sequence of
winning policies, which Kramer calls a vote-maximizing trajectory (i.e., a
sequence of policies such that each policy along the sequence beats with a
maximal number of votes its predecessor). Formally, for any two adjacent
policies (xt,x t+1) along the sequence, xt+1 ∈ argmaxy∈X n(y,xt).
Using our model, we have simulated the Kramer trajectories for the
three distributions of ability. The results are reported in Figures 6a,b,c.18
For each distribution, we get that the Kramer trajectory converges to a cy-
cle which is independent of the initial point. For each distribution we move
clockwise along the cycle with a coalition of the extremes alternating with
a coalition of the middle and low-income groups.
Figures 6 a,b,c
We have also represented the minmax set which is de￿ned as the set
of policies whose maximal opposition is minimal. Formally, minmax(X)=
argminx maxy6=xn(y,x). Kramer has demonstrated that for Euclidean pref-
erences the minmax set behaves like a basin of attraction in the sense that
any vote-maximizing trajectory converges to the minmax set. As shown
below, for the model used here (with non-Euclidian preferences), we obtain
that Kramer cycles always pass through the minmax set (which may reduce
t oas i n g l e t o n ) .
According to these simulation results, the prevalence of progressive taxa-
tion can only be explained, as for the Bipartisan and the Uncovered sets, by
the predominance of the middle class in the income distribution. Indeed only
18For each ￿gure, a and b vary by increment of 0.025 respectively in [−0.5,0.5] and [0,1].
20the triangular distribution (Figure 6b) with a lack of polarization at the ex-
tremes produces a Kramer cycle that only contains progressive taxes. Shift-
ing the probability mass of individual abilities evenly towards the extremes
(Figure 6a) makes the vote maximizing trajectory cycles evenly between re-
gressive and progressive taxes; while a high probability mass at low-ability
levels (Figure 6c) induces a Kramer cycle that only contains regressive taxes.
7 Conclusion
This paper is an attempt to explain the prevalence of income tax progressiv-
ity in a positive rather than normative perspective. We have used a highly
stylized model that nevertheless includes the salient aspects of voting over
non-linear income tax schedules. We have ￿rst shown that voting cycles over
the set of progressive and regressive taxes is inevitable when taxation is not
distortionary: progressive taxes (or convex tax function) enables the mid-
dle class to reduce its tax burden at the expense of the high-income group;
while regressive taxes (concave tax function) reduces the tax burden at the
extremes at the expense of the middle-class.
Introducing incentive eﬀects allows us to take account of the fact that
progressivity discourages eﬀort which to some extent ticks the model in fa-
vor of regressive taxes. However we show that vote cycling over progressive
and regressive taxes still prevails in the presence of incentive eﬀects. Then
we consider three diﬀerent ways to give better predictions on the voting out-
come and more importantly to explain the prevalence of progressive taxes.
The ￿rst approach reduces the policy space to the tax schedules that are
ideal for some voter. In that case we obtain a Condorcet winner corre-
sponding to the policy preferred by the median voter. The second approach
considers the entire policy space, but adopts weaker solution concepts in the
context of a simultaneous two-party competition game. The third approach
21considers a sequential two-party competition game in which parties not only
care about winning, but also about the size of their majority.
The main result is that whatever the approach adopted, progressive taxes
emerge as the only possible voting outcome when there is a lack of polar-
ization at the extremes of the income distribution. In this exercise, we do
not pretend we have succeeded in capturing the reason of the revealed pref-
erence for progressive income taxation, but perhaps we have captured some
of its ground. Further research is of course needed to solve this demand for
progressivity puzzle.
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